Abstract. We analyze the Sibert et al. group-based (Feige-Fiat-Shamir type) authentication protocol and show that the protocol is not computationally zero-knowledge. In addition, we provide experimental evidence that our approach is practical and can succeed even for groups with no efficiently computable length function such as braid groups. The novelty of this work is that we are not attacking the protocol by trying to solve an underlying complex algebraic problem, namely, the conjugacy search problem, but use a probabilistic approach, instead.
Introduction
The group-based cryptography attracted a lot of attention after invention of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld [1] and Ko-Lee et al. [20] key-exchange protocols in 1999. Since then a number of new cryptographic protocols, including public-key authentication protocols, based on infinite groups were invented and analyzed. One may consult [24] and [11] to learn more about general group-based cryptography. In this paper we consider a particular interactive group-based authentication scheme, Sibert et al. protocol (see [11, 34] ).
Recall that any interactive proof of knowledge system is a multi-round randomized protocol for two parties, in which one of the parties (the Prover) wishes to convince another party (the Verifier) of the validity of a given assertion. Every interactive proof of knowledge should satisfy completeness and soundness properties [14, 16] :
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Completeness: If the assertion is true, it should be accepted by the Verifier with high probability.
Soundness:
If the assertion is false, then the Verifier rejects it with high probability.
If the Prover does not trust the Verifier and does not want to compromise any private information in the process of providing the proof of identity, then the following property, concerned with the preservation of security, becomes very important:
Zero-Knowledge (ZK): Except the validity of the Prover's assertions, no other information is revealed in the process of the proof.
If a given protocol possesses the zero-knowledge property, then it is considered to be a zero-knowledge interactive proof system [16] .
There are three different notions of zero-knowledge that have been commonly used in the literature [11, 15, 16] ; namely, perfect zero-knowledge, statistical zeroknowledge, and computational zero-knowledge. The first notion is the most strict definition of ZK, which is rarely useful in practice. The last notion of the ZK property (computational zero-knowledge) is the most liberal notion, and it is used more frequently in practice than the others.
Sibert et al. authentication protocol, is an example of an interactive (dynamic, randomized) proof system. In this paper, we use probabilistic tools, introduced in [27] and outlined in Section 2.3 below, to design an attack on this particular cryptographic primitive and show that it is not computationally zero-knowledge. In addition, we conduct some experiments that support our conclusions and show that the protocol is not secure in practice.
Description of the protocol
The Sibert's protocol is an iterated two-party three-pass Feige-Fiat-Shamir [14] type authentication protocol. There are two slightly different descriptions of the protocol available in [11] and [34] with two different key generation algorithms. In [34] , the protocol is introduced as Scheme II. Here, we follow the description of the scheme from the survey [11] , except for the minor notational modifications in the conjugation. These modifications do not affect the protocol and its cryptographic properties at all (inverting r and y in [11] would resolve it). In addition, [11] and [34] treat the protocol slightly differently themselves, with and without a collision-free one-way hash function, respectively. Nevertheless, it is not essential for our analysis.
Let G be a (non-commutative, infinite) group, called the platform group and a probability measure on G. The Prover's private key is an element s 2 G, the Prover's public key is a pair .w; t /, where w is an arbitrary element of the group G, called the base element, and t D s 1 ws is a conjugate of w by s. In addition, we assume that H is a collision-free one-way hash function from G to ¹0; 1º N . A single round of the protocol is performed as follows:
(i) The Prover chooses a random element r 2 G, called the nonce, according to the probability measure , and sends x D H.r 1 t r/, called the commitment, to the Verifier.
(ii) The Verifier chooses a random bit c, called the challenge, and sends it to the Prover. This round is repeated k times to guarantee the soundness error (i.e., probability that a cheating Prover will be able to convince the Verifier of a false statement) of order 2 k , which is considered to be negligible if k is large, say k 100. The Sibert's protocol satisfies both, completeness and soundness, properties of interactive proof systems.
In addition, [34] describes another authentication protocol, the so-called Scheme III, which is different from the one described above. Even though techniques of this paper do not directly apply to that protocol, we believe that using similar ideas, this scheme can be successfully attacked as well.
Security of the protocol
Note that if an intruder (named Eve) can compute the secret element s or any element s 0 2 G such that t D s 0 1 ws 0 , i.e., if Eve can solve the conjugacy search problem for G, then she can authenticate as the Prover. Thus, as indicated in [34] , the computational difficulty of the conjugacy search problem for G is necessary for security of this protocol.
Originally, it was proposed to use braid groups B n (see [2, 13, 19] ) as platform groups, because there was no efficient solution of the conjugacy search problem for B n known. This motivated a lot of research about braid groups. As a result of recent developments [3] [4] [5] ), there is an opinion that the conjugacy search problem for B n can be solved in polynomial time. If that is true in fact, then the Sibert et al. authentication protocol is insecure for B n . Nevertheless, the same protocol can be used with other platform groups and, hence, it is important to have tools for analysis of this type of general Sibert protocols. We show in the present paper that it is not necessary to solve the conjugacy search problem for G to break the scheme. Instead, one can analyze zero-knowledge property of the protocol by employing ideas from probability theory and show that the protocol is insecure under a mild assumption of existence of an efficiently computable length function for the platform group G. Even for groups with no efficiently computable length function, such as B n , a reasonable approximation can do the job. Now, let be a probability measure on a platform group G. We say that is left-invariant if for every A Â G and g 2 G the equality .A/ D .gA/ holds. The following result is proved in [34] .
Proposition ([34] ). Let G be a group. If the conjugacy search problem for G is computationally hard (cannot be solved by a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine) and is a left-invariant probability measure on G then the outlined above protocol is a zero knowledge interactive proof system.
Clearly, there are no left-invariant probability measures on braid groups, used as platform groups in the protocol, and, therefore, as noticed in [11] and [34] , this protocol cannot be a perfect zero knowledge interactive proof system when used with an infinite group such as B n . Nevertheless, it is conjectured in [34] that the scheme can be computationally zero knowledge for certain distributions on B n . The authors supported that conjecture by statistical arguments based on length analysis.
The idea of mean-set attack: the shift search problem
If we look at the protocol outlined in Section 1.1, we observe that the Prover sends to the Verifier a sequence of random elements of two types: r and sr, where r is a randomly generated element and s is the Prover's secret element. Any passive eavesdropper (Eve) can arrange a table of challenge/response transactions, where each row corresponds to a single round of the protocol, as shown in the table, and obtain two sets of elements, corresponding to c D 0 and c D 1 respectively: R 0 D ¹r i 1 ; : : : ; r i k º and R 1 D ¹sr j 1 ; : : : ; sr j n k º; where all elements r i are distributed according to , i.e., all these elements are generated by the same random generator. Eve's goal is to recover the secret element s based on the intercepted sequences R 0 and R 1 . We call this problem a shift search problem.
To explain the idea of the mean-set attack, assume for a moment that the group G is an infinite cyclic group Z. In that case, we can rewrite the elements of R 1 in additive notation ¹s C r j 1 ; : : : ; s C r j n k º. Then we can compute the empirical average r 0 D 1 k P k mD1 r i m of the elements in R 0 Z and the empirical average
: : : : : : : : : n c D 0 r n -By the strong law of large numbers for real-valued random variables the larger the sequence R 0 is, the closer the value of r 0 to the actual mean E. / of the distribution on Z, induced by r. Similarly, the larger the sequence R 1 is, the closer the value of r 1 is to the number s C E. /. Therefore, subtracting r 0 from r 1 , we obtain a good guess of what s is. Observe three crucial properties that allow us to compute the secret element in the case G D Z:
(AV1) (Strong law of large numbers for real-valued random variables) If
is a sequence of independent and identically distribute (i.i.d.) real-valued random variables, then 1 n
with probability one as n ! 1, provided E. 1 / < 1:
(AV2) ("Shift" property or linearity) For any real-valued random variable , the formula
(AV3) (Efficient computations) The average value 1 n P n iD1 i is efficiently computable.
Geometrically, we can interpret this approach as follows. Given a large sample of random, independent, and identically distributed points r i 1 ; : : : ; r i k and a large sample of shifted points s C r j 1 ; : : : ; s C r j n k on the real line, the shift s is "effectively visible".
It turns out that the same is true in general infinite groups. One can generalize a number of mathematical tools of the classical probability theory to finitely generated groups (see [27] and Section 2.3 below) in order to have the counterparts of (AV1), (AV2), and (AV3). Indeed, for a random group element W ! G, one can define a set E. / Â G called the mean-set, for a sample of n random group elements 1 ; : : : ; n , one can define their average -a set S n D S. 1 ; : : : ; n / Â G called the sample mean-set of elements 1 ; : : : ; n , so that we have a "shift" property E.s / D sE. / and a generalization of the strong law of large numbers (SLLN) for groups with respect to E. / in a sense that S. 1 ; : : : ; n / converges to E. 1 / as n ! 1 with probability one (see Section 2.3 for precise definitions and statements). In addition, assume that sample mean S. 1 ; : : : ; n / is efficiently computable. Using the operator S, Eve can compute a set S.sr j 1 ; : : : ; sr j n k / OES.r i 1 ; : : : ; r i k / 1 ; which should contain s with high probability when n is sufficiently large. This is the idea of the mean-set attack and our approach to the shift search problem. Furthermore, one can show that the more rounds of the protocol are performed, the more information about the secret key our attack gains (note that at the same time the protocol is iterated by its nature, and large number of rounds is important for its reliability in a sense of the soundness property). The discussion above leads to the main theoretical results of this paper, proved in Section 4. ÄO.e Dn /:
Outline
Section 2 reviews some necessary graph-and group-theoretic preliminaries that constitute the setting of our work. In Section 2.3, we recall the notion of the meanset (expectation) of a (graph-)group-valued random element, introduced in [27] , and main theorems relevant to this object to prepare the ground for the main results; in particular, we discuss the "shift" property, the strong law of large numbers, and the analogues of Chebyshev and Chernoff-like inequalities for graphs and groups. In Section 3, we propose an algorithm for computing mean-sets. Next, we turn to formulations and proofs of the main theoretical results of this paper, the mean-set attack principles under different assumptions. This task is carried out in Section 4. At the end of that section, we indicate that even if the proposed algorithm fails, we can still gain some information about the secret key of the Prover. In other words, the more rounds of the protocol are performed, the more information about the secret key we can gain. In Section 5.1, we present results of our experiments with the classical key generation according to [11] . Section 5.2 is concerned with results of experiments with the alternative (special) key generation proposed by Sibert et al. in [34] . At the end, in Section 6, we discuss possible methods for defending against the mean-set attack.
Preliminaries
Let us briefly recall some definitions of group and graph theory. For a better insight into graph theory, the reader is referred to [35] , while [21] can serve as a good introduction into group theory.
Graphs
An undirected graph is an ordered pair of sets .V; E/ where
If e D .v 1 ; v 2 / 2 E then we say that v 1 and v 2 are adjacent in . The number of vertices adjacent to v is called the degree of v. We say that the graph is locally-finite if every vertex has a finite degree. A directed graph is an ordered pair of sets .V; E/ where E D E./ is a set of ordered pairs .v 1 ; v 2 / 2 V V . If e D .v 1 ; v 2 / 2 E, then we say that v 1 is the origin of the edge e, denoted by o.e/, and v 2 is the terminus of e, denoted by t.e/. An undirected graph can be viewed as a directed graph in which a pair .v 1 ; v 2 / 2 E serves as two edges .v 1 ; v 2 / and .v 2 ; v 1 /.
A path p in a directed graph is a finite sequence of edges e 1 ; : : : ; e n such that t.e i / D o.e iC1 /. The vertex o.e 1 / is called the origin of the path p and is denoted by o.p/. The vertex t.e n / is called the terminus of the path p and is denoted by t.p/. The number n is called the length of the path p and is denoted by jpj. We say that two vertices v 1 ; v 2 2 V ./ are connected, if there exists a path from v 1 to v 2 in . The graph is connected if every pair of vertices is connected.
The distance between v 1 and v 2 in a graph is the length d.v 1 ; v 2 / of a shortest path between v 1 and v 2 . If v 1 and v 2 are disconnected, then d.
We say that a path p D e 1 ; : : : ; e n from v 1 to v 2 is geodesic in a graph if
A path p D e 1 ; : : : ; e n in a graph is closed, if o.p/ D t.p/. In this case we say that p is a cycle in . A path p is simple, if no proper segment of p is a cycle. The graph is a tree if it does not contain a simple cycle.
Groups and Cayley graphs
Consider a finite set, also called alphabet, X D ¹x 1 ; : : : ; x n º, and let X 1 be the set of formal inverses ¹x 1 1 ; : : : ; x 1 n º of elements in X . This defines an involution 1 on the set X˙1 WD X [ X 1 which maps every symbol x 2 X to its formal inverse x 1 2 X 1 and every symbol x 1 2 X 1 to the original x 2 X . An alphabet X is called a group alphabet if X 1 Â X , and there is an involution which maps elements of X to their inverses. An X -digraph is a graph .V; E/ with edges labeled by elements in X˙1 D X [ X 1 such that for any edge e D u ! u, which is called the inverse of e and is denoted by e 1 . See [18] for more information on X -digraphs.
Let G be a group and X G a set of generators for G, i.e. G D hX i. Assume that X is closed under inversion, i.e., X D X˙1. The Cayley graph C G .X / of G relative to X is a labeled graph .V; E/, where the vertex set is V D G, and the edge set E contains all edges of the form g 1 x ! g 2 where g 1 ; g 2 2 G, x 2 X and g 2 D g 1 x and only them. The distance between elements g 1 ; g 2 2 G relative to the generating set X is the distance in the graph C G .X / between vertices g 1 and g 2 or, equivalently,
Random (graph-)group elements
In this section, we recall some of the main notions and results of [27] that are employed further in the present paper. Let D .V; E/ be a locally-finite connected graph and . ; F ; P / a probability space. A measurable mapping W ! V ./ is called a random graph element defined on a given probability space. A random -element induces an atomic probability measure on V ./ defined in a usual way as
where d.v; s/ is the distance between v and s in . The domain of M is the set
It is proved in [27] that for any distribution on V .
In the case when domain.M / D V ./, we say that M. / is totally defined. Given that domain.M / D V ./, the mean-set of a -valued is defined to be a set of vertices minimizing the weight function, i.e.,
Sometimes we write E. / and speak of the mean-set of distribution . Using the Cayley graph construction one can similarly define a notion of the mean-set for a finitely generated group G (relative to a fixed generating set). Similar mean values (in different settings) are used rather often; see [27] for some history and literature sources. Below, we recall some results proved in [27] .
Lemma 2.1 ([27]). Let be a random -element, where is a connected locallyfinite graph, with totally defined weight function M . /. Then the mean-set E. / is non-empty and finite.
The next property is an analogue of the property E.c C / D c C E. / for real-valued random variables. Proposition 2.2 (Shift property, [27] ). Let G D hX i be a finitely generated group and g 2 G. Let be a random G-element. Then for a random element g defined by g .!/ WD g .!/ we have E. g / D gE. /:
It is easy to see that this property follows from the fact that for any g 1 ; g 2 ; s 2 G the equality d X .g 1 ; g 2 / D d X .sg 1 ; sg 2 / holds, where d X .g 1 ; g 2 / is the distance between elements g 1 ; g 2 2 G relative to X (see Section 2). Now let 1 ; : : : ; n be a sample of independent and identically distributed graphvalued random elements i W ! V ./ defined on a given probability space . ; F ; P/ and n .v/ be the relative frequency
with which the value v 2 V ./ occurs in the random sample 1 .!/; : : : ; n .!/.
be the random weight, called the sampling weight, corresponding to v 2 V ./, and M n . / the resulting random sampling weight function. The set of vertices
is called the sample mean-set (or sample center-set) relative to . The next theorem shows that the sets S n and E. / in play roles analogous to the classical average of real values
and the classical expectation E of a real-valued random variable respectively, in the non-commutative case. In other words, the strong law of large numbers generalized to graphs and groups states that our (empirical) sample mean-set S n converges to the (theoretical) mean-set E. / as n ! 1. 
holds with probability one.
Moreover, the following asymptotic upper bounds (analogues of the classical Chebyshev and Chernoff bounds) on convergence rate hold: Theorem 2.5 (Chebyshev's inequality for graphs, [27] 
Effective computation of a mean-set
Let G be a group and ¹ i º n iD1 a sequence of random i.i.d. elements taking values in G such that the corresponding weight function M. / is totally defined. In Section 2.3, we introduced a notion of the mean-set of that satisfies the desirable properties (AV1) and (AV2) of Section 1.3. One of the technical difficulties encountered in practice is that, unlike the classical average value .x 1 C C x n /=n for real-valued random variables, the sample mean-set S n is hard to compute. In other words, in general, our definition of the meat-set might not satisfy the property (AV3).
Several problems arise when trying to compute S n :
Straightforward computation of the set ¹M.g/ j g 2 Gº requires at least O.jGj 2 / steps. This is computationally infeasible for large groups G, and impossible for infinite groups. Hence we might want to reduce the search of a minimum to some small part of G.
There exist infinite groups in which the distance function d. ; / is very difficult to compute. The braid group B 1 is an example for such a group. The computation of the distance function for B 1 is known to be NP-hard, see [31] . Such groups require special treatment. Moreover, there exist infinite groups for which the distance function d. ; / is not computable. We omit consideration of such groups.
We devise a heuristic procedure to solve the first problem. As proved in [27] , if the weight function M. / satisfies certain local monotonicity properties, then our procedure achieves the desired result. Our algorithm is a simple direct descent heuristic, in which we use the sample weight function M n that comes from a sample of random group elements ¹g 1 ; : : : ; g n º from a finitely-generated group G.
Algorithm 3.1 (Direct Descent Heuristic).
Input: A group G with a finite set of generators X Â G and a sequence of elements ¹g 1 ; : : : ; g n º in G. Output: An element g 2 G that locally minimizes M n . /.
Computations:
A. Choose a random g 2 G according to some probability measure on G.
B. If for every x 2 X˙1, M n .g/ Ä M n .gx/, then output g.
C.
Otherwise put g gx, where x 2 X˙1 is an element minimizing the value of M n .gx/ and go to step B.
As any other direct descend heuristic method, Algorithm 3.1 might not work if the function M n has local minima. It is proved in [27] that it always works for trees and, hence, for free groups.
Theorem 3.2 ([27]). Let be a distribution on a locally-finite tree T such that a function M is totally defined. Then Algorithm 3.1 for T and M finds a central point (mean-set) of on T .
The second problem of computing S n concerns practical computations of length function in G. It turns out that we need a relatively mild assumption to deal with it -the existence of an efficiently computable distance function d X . ; /; even a "reasonable" approximation of the length function may work. In this work we approximate geodesic length using the method described in [25] . Even though it does not guarantee the optimal result, it was proved to be practically useful in a series of attacks, see [22, 23, 29, 30 ].
The mean-set attack
In this section, we use theoretical results stated above to attack the Sibert et al. protocol, described in Section 1.1. In the following heuristic attack we use the Algorithm 3.1 to compute sample mean-set S n .
Algorithm 4.1 (The mean-set attack).
Input: The Prover's public element .t; w/ and sequences R 0 and R 1 as in the protocol. Output: An element z satisfying the equality t D z 1 wz (which can be considered as the Prover's private key), or Failure.
Computations:
A. Apply Algorithm 3.1 to R 0 and obtain g 0 .
B. Apply Algorithm 3.1 to R 1 and obtain g 1 .
If the algorithm outputs an element z 2 G, then z can serve as the Prover's original secret s; any solution of the conjugacy equation t D x 1 wx does. In general, z can be different from s, and there are no means for the adversary to determine whether z D s. In spite of that, Eve, who is only trying to authenticate as the Prover, considers this z a success. On the other hand, since our goal is to show that the protocol is not computationally zero-knowledge, we estimate the probability to find s. Only this original secret element s is considered as a success in our analysis. Other outcomes that work for Eve (when z ¤ s) are ignored.
The theorems below give asymptotic bounds on the failure rate (for the original s) in the mean-set attack. We show that the probability of the failure can decrease linearly or exponentially, depending on the distribution . Furthermore, we can get Chernoff-like asymptotic bound if we impose one restriction on distribution . Recall the original Hoeffding's inequality [17] well known in probability theory. Assume that ¹x i º is a sequence of independent random variables and that every x i is almost surely bounded, i.e., P.x i E.x i / 2 OEa i ; b i / D 1 for some a i ; b i 2 R. Then for the sum S n D x 1 C C x n , the inequality
holds. If x i are identically distributed, then we get the inequality
Now we can prove the Mean-set attack principle with exponential bounds. Applying inequality (4.1) to Bernoulli random variables ¹c i º, we get
Thus, we obtain a bound .2) is called the error of the method. Clearly, one only needs to enumerate all words e of length up to je 
Experiments
To demonstrate the practical use of our mean-set attack, we perform a series of experiments, which we describe below. In [34] , [11] two different methods of generation of nonce elements were proposed, both with the same platform group B n , which has the following (Artin's) presentation:
We distinguish between the two ways, classical ( [11] ) and alternative ( [34] ), to generate elements of the underlying group by performing two different sets of experiments outlined below in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. In both cases, we observe that the secret information of the Prover is not secure, and the probability to break the protocol grows as the number of rounds of the protocol increases. All experiments are done using the CRAG software package [9] .
Classical key generation
Classical key generation of the elements of B n was suggested in [11] with parameters n D 50 (rank of the braid group) and the lengths of private keys L D 512. The length function relative to the Artin generators ¹ 1 ; : : : ; n 1 º is NP -hard. That is why in this paper, as it was already mentioned in Section 3, we use the approximation of geodesic length method, proposed in [23] . See [22, 23, 29, 30] for a series of successful attacks using this method. We want to emphasize that we compute the sampling weight values in the Algorithm 3.1, which is a subroutine in Algorithm 4.1, using the approximated distance function values in B n .
One of the disadvantages of the approximation algorithm that we used is that there is no polynomial time upper bound for that as it uses Dehornoy handle-free forms [10] . As a result we do not know the complexity of our algorithm and we do not know how our algorithm scales with parameter values. In each experiment we randomly generate an instance of the authentication protocol and try to break it, i.e., find the private key, using the techniques developed in this paper. Recall that each authentication is a series of k 3-pass commitment-challenge-response rounds. Therefore, an instance of authentication consists of k triples .x i ; c i ; r i /, i D 1; : : : ; k obtained as described in Section 1.1. Here x i is a commitment, c i is a challenge, and r i is a response. A random bit c i is chosen randomly and uniformly from the set ¹0; 1º. In our experiments we make an assumption that exactly half of c i 's are 0 and half are 1. This allows us to see an instance of the protocol as a pair of equinumerous sets R 0 D ¹r 1 ; : : : ; r k=2 º B n and R 1 D ¹sr 0 1 ; : : : ; sr 0 k=2 º B n . The main parameters for the system are the rank n of the braid group, the number of rounds k in the protocol, and the length L of secret keys. We generate a single instance of the problem with parameters .n; k; L/ as follows:
A braid s is chosen randomly and uniformly as a word of length L over a group alphabet ¹ 1 ; : : : ; n 1 º. This braid is a secret element which is used only to generate further data and to compare the final element to.
A sequence R 0 D ¹r 1 ; : : : ; r k=2 º of braid words chosen randomly and uniformly as words of length L over a group alphabet ¹ 1 ; : : : ; n 1 º.
A sequence R 1 D ¹sr For every parameter set .n; k; L/ we generate 1000 random instances .R 0 ; R 1 / and run Algorithm 4.1 which attempts to find the secret key s used in the generation of R 1 .
Below we present the results of actual experiments done for groups B 5 , B 10 , and B 20 . Horizontally we have increasing number of rounds k from 10 to 320 and vertically we have increasing lengths L from 10 to 100. Every cell contains a pair .P %; E/ where P is a success rate and E is an average length of the error (4.2) of the method for the corresponding pair .L; k/ of parameter values. All experiments were performed using CRAG library [9] . The library provides an environment to test cryptographic protocols constructed from non-commutative groups, for example the braid group. We immediately observe from the data in Tables 1-3 that: the success rate increases as the number of rounds (sample size) increases; the success rate decreases as the length of the key increases; the success rate increases as the rank of the group increases;
the average error length decreases as we increase the number of rounds.
The first observation is the most interesting since the number of rounds is one of the main reliability parameters of the protocol, namely, the soundness error decreases as 1=2 k as the number of rounds k gets larger. But, at the same time, we observe that security of the scheme decreases as k increases. The second observation can be interpreted as follows -the longer the braids are the more difficult it is to compute the approximation. The third observation is easy to explain. The bigger the rank of the group the more braid generators commute and the simpler random braids are.
Alternative key generation
As we have mentioned in Section 1.2, the Sibert et al. scheme, proposed in [34] , does not possess perfect zero knowledge property. Nevertheless, the authors of [34] try to achieve computational zero knowledge by proposing a special way of generating public and private information. They provide some statistical evidence that the scheme can be computationally zero knowledge if this alternative key generation is used. In this section we, firstly, outline the proposed key generation method and, secondly, present actual experiments supporting our theoretical results even for this special key generation method. The method of generating of braids in [34] can be translated to the notation of the present paper as follows. The Prover generates nonce elements r as products of L uniformly chosen permutation braids p i (see [13] 
in particular, r belongs to the corresponding positive monoid. the secret key s as the inverse of a product of L uniformly chosen permutation braids from B n , i.e.,
We made a very useful observation when doing the experiments with so generated nonce elements r. We observed that the mean-set in this case is often a singleton set of the form ¹ k º, where is a half-twist braid and k 2 N. Therefore, to enhance the performance of Algorithm 3.1 in step B, we test not only generators x 2 X˙1, but also x D , and if (in step C) minimizes the value of M n .gx/, then we put x ! x and return to step B.
In fact it is an interesting question if the uniform distribution on a sphere in a Garside monoid G C has a singleton mean set ¹ k G C º for some k 2 N, where G C is the Garside element, , in G C ? This is clearly true for free abelian monoids. As we mention above, experiments show that the same can be true in the braid monoid.
Below we present the results of actual experiments done for the group B 10 . Horizontally we have increasing number of rounds k from 10 to 320 and vertically we have increasing lengths L (in permutation braids) from 3 to 10. Every cell contains a pair .P %; E/ where P is a success rate and E is the average length of the error for the corresponding pair .L; k/ of parameter values.
Since the average Artin length (denoted L 0 in the tables below) of a permutation braid on n strands is of order n 2 , the length of nonce elements grows very fast with L; it is shown in the leftmost column of the tables in parentheses. For instance, we can see that for B 10 the average length of a product of L D 3 permutation braids is 81, the average length of a product of L D 5 permutation braids is 138, etc. Again, we observe that success rate increases as we increase the number of rounds, and the average error length decreases as we increase the number of rounds.
L(L')nk

Defending against the attack
In this section, we describe several principles one can follow in order to defend against the mean-set attack presented in this paper or, at least, to make it computationally infeasible. Defending can be done through a special choice of the platform group G or a special choice of a distribution on G. Another purpose of this section is to motivate further study of distributions on groups and computational properties of groups.
Groups with no efficiently computable length functions
One of the main tools in our technique is an efficiently computable function d X . ; / on G. To prevent the attacker from computing mean-sets, one can use a platform group G with a hardly computable length function d X . ; / relative to any "reasonable" finite generating set X . By reasonable generating set we mean a set, which is small relative to the main security parameter. Examples of such groups exist. For instance, length function for any finitely presented group with unsolvable word problem is not computable. On the other hand, it is hard to work with such groups, as they do not have efficiently computable normal forms.
A more interesting example is a multiplicative group of a prime field Z p . The group Z p is cyclic, i.e., Z p D hai for some primitive root a of p. It is easy to see that the length of an element b 2 Z p satisfies
and hence the problem of computing the length of an element and the discrete logarithm problem are computationally equivalent. The discrete logarithm problem is widely believed to be computationally hard and is used as a basis of security of many cryptographic protocols, most notably the ElGamal [12] and CramerShoup [8] cryptosystems. In other words, Z p is another example of a group with hardly computable length function.
Systems of probability measures
Let G be a platform group. Recall that our assumption was that the Prover uses a fixed distribution on the set of nonce elements, i.e., every element r i is generated using the same random generator. Instead he can use a sequence of probability measures ¹ i º 1 iD1 , where each measure i , i D 1; 2; : : :, is not used more than once (ever), i.e., every nonce r i , i D 1; 2; : : :, is generated using a unique distribution ¹ i º. In this case, the attacker does not have theoretical grounds for working with sampling mean-sets. Nevertheless, it can turn out that the sequence of random elements r 1 ; r 2 ; : : : can have some other distribution and the attack will work. Another difficulty with implementing this idea is that there is no systematic study of distributions on general finitely generated groups and, in particular, braid groups. So, it is hard to propose some particular sequence of probability distributions. Some aspects of defining probability measures on infinite groups are discussed in [7] and [6] .
Undefined mean-set
Another way to foil the attack is to use a distribution on G such that E. / is not defined, i.e., the corresponding weight function is not totally defined. In that case the assumption of Theorem 4.2 fails, and it is easy to see that the sampling weights M n .g/ tend to 1 with probability 1. Nevertheless, we still can compare the sampling weight values, as explained in [26] and [28] , where it is shown that the condition of finiteness of M .2/ can be relaxed to that of finiteness of M .1/ . If M .1/ is not defined then that means that the lengths of commitments are too large and are impractical.
Large mean-set
Also, to foil the attack one can use a distribution on G such that the set E. / is large. As an example consider an authentication protocol in [33] , based on the difficulty of computing discrete discrete logarithms in groups of prime order. The space of nonce elements in [33] is an additive group Z q acting by exponentiations on a bigger group Z p . It is easy to compute length in .Z q ; C/ D h1i. But, since the nonce elements r 2 Z q are chosen uniformly, it follows that the mean-set is the whole group Z q (the uniform measure is right-invariant) and in this case it is impossible to detect the shift s and the mean-set attack fails. We also refer to [32] for a modification of [33] where nonce elements are not taken modulo q and security proof requires a boundary on the number of times the same key is used. Now, let G be an infinite group. It is impossible to generate elements of G uniformly, but one can try to achieve the property described below that can foil the mean-set attack. Choose a probability measure on G so that the mean-set set E. / is large. Recall that Algorithm 4.1 can find up to one element of G minimizing the weight function. For that it uses Algorithm 3.1 which randomly (according to some measure ) chooses an element of g 2 G and then gradually changes it (descends) to minimize its M value. This way the distribution on the initial choices g 2 G defines a distribution on the set of local minima of M on G. More precisely, for g 0 2 G, .g 0 / D ¹g 2 G j Algorithm 3.1 stops with the answer g 0 on input gº:
Denote by s the shifted probability measure on G by an element s defined by s .g/ D .s 1 g/. If S Â G is the set of local minima of the weight function M relative to then the set sS is the set of local minima relative to s . But the distribution s does not have to be induced from by the shift s, i.e., the equality s .g/ D .s 1 g/ does not have to hold. In fact, the distributions and s can "favor" unrelated subsets of S and sS respectively. That would definitely foil the attack presented in this paper. On the other hand, if and s are related, then the mean-set attack can still work.
Finally, we want to mention again that probability measures on groups were not extensively studied and there are no good probability measures known on general groups and no general methods to construct measures satisfying the desired properties. Moreover, the problem of making distributions with large mean-sets is very complicated because not every subset of a group G can be realized as a mean-set. See [27] and [26] for more details. A number of open questions arise regarding the problems mentioned above, but dealing with them is beyond the scope of this paper.
Conclusion
In this paper, we used the probabilistic approach to analyze the Sibert et al. groupbased authentication protocol. We have proved that the scheme does not meet necessary security compliances, i.e., it is not computationally zero-knowledge, in practice. To conduct our analysis, we introduced a new computational problem for finitely generated groups, the shift search problem, and employed probabilistic tools discussed in [27] to deal with the problem. In particular, the concept of the mean-set and the generalized strong law of large numbers for random group elements with values in the vertices of the connected and locally-finite Cayley graph of a given infinite finitely-generated group are used. The rate of success of getting the secret key, as a solution to the shift search problem, has been proved to be linear or exponential depending on the assumptions one is willing to make. In addition, we have provided experimental evidence that our approach is practical and can succeed even for braid groups. This work shows, among other things, that generalization of classical probabilistic results to combinatorial objects can lead to useful applications in group-based cryptography.
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